Category Archives: Terrorism

Risk of NATO overstretch in Syria

By Anders Corr, Ph.D.

The Obama administration is currently under pressure by certain US lawmakers, as well as Britain, France, and Israel, to take limited military action in Syria. These actions could include securing a humanitarian corridor into the country, providing military equipment to the non-Al Qaeda affiliated Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), and destroying the Syrian Air Force (WSJ).

Such measures might remove a bit of pressure from rebels and provide a public opinion boost to current participating governments in the US, France, and Britain, in that voting publics in those countries would feel that their governments were doing something positive to end the Syrian crisis. However, due to the limited nature of the proposed military measures, they would not alter the balance of forces on any side of the complex conflict and could lead to notable negative consequences. Continue reading

Improved diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iran

Saturday marked the first flight between Egypt and Iran since 1979. The election of Islamist President Mohamad Mursi in Egypt in June 2012 significantly thawed relations between the two countries. Diplomatic ties had been cut by Iran in 1979 when the deposed Shah took refuge in Egypt, but the heads of state from the two countries visited in February and the relationship is now largely mended (Reuters).

President Mursi was a leader in the pan-Islamist movement called the Muslim Brotherhood, which has approximately 600,000 members who pay a percentage of their incomes to the organization. It has members worldwide, and promotes Sharia law and the unification of Arab states. These goals are, incidentally, shared by the terrorist group Al Qaeda. The 2011 popular overthrow of President Mubarak in Egypt served as a strong indicator of the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing power. The US announced diplomatic relations with the group immediately following. Egypt was a strong US ally against the Soviets during the Cold War, and was a voice for stability in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The manifestation of the Arab Spring in Egypt, which deposed long-time US ally Hosni Mubarak, has not been kind to US foreign policy goals in the region.

Iran and Egypt are the third and sixth largest Muslim countries by GDP. Iran has a GDP of $522 billion and Egypt has a GDP of $231 billion (United Nations 2011). While the economy is half that of Iran, Egypt will attempt to expand its regional power status in the Arab states, Africa, and closely align with Iran and China.

For indicators of balancing against NATO and tilting away from the US, watch for Egypt joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an observer state, as has Iran. Watch for increased commercial relations with North Korea and Iran, and improved diplomatic ties with Pakistan. For indicators of nuclear club aspirations, watch for Egyptian efforts to improve types of nuclear power generation that yield fissile by-products for potential use in nuclear weapons. Also watch for increased Egyptian government links to organizations with likely ties to global terrorism. Egyptian political instability will continue until more authoritarian rule is imposed by either the Islamists or the pro-western faction. Expect further loss of value in Egypt-tied investments, including equities, commercial debt, and sovereign debt. Egyptian oil production is less than 1% of global supply, so there should be negligible effects on oil prices.

North Korean WMD terrorism as much a threat as nuclear-tipped missiles

Today North Korea put their medium-range missiles on combat alert and repeated threats against US military bases including in South Korea, Guam, and Hawaii. The US Defense Department sent a strong signal by flying two nuclear-capable B-2 Stealth Bombers over South Korea in training exercises, and through comments to the press by the Defense Secretary that indicate a readiness for conflict should that be necessary. A Defense Department spokesman softened those comments by reiterated that the US seeks to deescalate tensions, and that the important goal is to stay ahead of North Korea in terms of its capability to marry a nuclear warhead with a missile delivery vehicle (CNN). However, a potentially greater threat from North Korea is an unconventional or terrorist delivery of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Were a nuclear device to explode in a major port city, for example, it would likely cause up to one trillion dollars of damages, 500,000 deaths, and $40-70 billion in trade losses  (BloombergCongressional Research Service).

It is unlikely that the North Koreans would follow-through on their most recent threats, and unlikely that were they to try, a missile strike would be effective. The North Koreans are having difficulty with the technical challenges of component miniaturization that would allow them to place a nuclear warhead on a missile. To stave off such an attack in the future, the US must nevertheless maintain robust intelligence, deterrent, and preemptive strike capabilities. North Korea could provide us with an unpleasant surprise. Saddam Hussein surprised the world in 1990 with the progress he had made towards achieving nuclear status, and there is much more technological improvement in rogue state nuclear capabilities twenty years later.

China and Russia are likely sharing, to a limited extent, nuclear technologies with Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. These rogue states are likely sharing with each other as well. This sharing does not necessarily have to be state-sanctioned. A poorly-supervised agency within a rogue state would have the capability to proliferate nuclear or other WMD technologies without the knowledge of its government. Many individual scientists or government officials in these corrupt countries, if offered sufficient incentive, would likely be willing to share technological expertise or hardware necessary for the making of blueprints or reverse-engineering.

Staying ahead of North Korean improvements is a challenging task, and risky. As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously said,  “There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” (Press Briefing, February 12, 2002)

The risk is not only that North Korea has a nuclear delivery capability about which we are unaware, but that they could be considering unconventional approaches to delivery. These approaches could include smuggling a nuclear weapon into the United States, Japan, or South Korea. Radiation detection used on all containerized cargo coming into the United States does not effectively detect nuclear materials encased in lead. X-ray scanning, which might detect such encased materials, is only used on 4% of the highest-risk cargo inbound to the United States. The Department of Homeland Security has found it impractical to implement a 2007 Congressional mandate to scan 100% of incoming containerized cargo  (Bloomberg). Implementation of scanning and detection technologies is currently insufficient to guard against nuclear terrorists or rogue states that use containerized cargo as a delivery vehicle.

North Korea could also simply drive nuclear materials and components across the Canadian or Mexican borders, or smuggle them on fast boats from a nearby Latin American country. Such components can be reassembled once in the United States.

Finally, North Korea is in a unique position to use biological weapons of mass destruction. Often referred to as a hermit kingdom, North Korea has the world’s strictest restrictions on immigration and emigration. This makes them relatively invulnerable to blowback from a biological WMD. The most dangerous biological weapons are highly contagious. Contagion through humans is the delivery vehicle. Thus a strong disincentive for use of biological weapons by non-secluded states is the danger that the contagion will spread to one’s own country. This applies to a much lesser degree for North Korea. Biological weapons have the advantage over nuclear weapons in that they cannot be detected by radiation detectors or x-ray scanners, can be produced by small teams of bio-chemists with relatively ordinary lab equipment, and would be easily smuggled in containerized cargo. North Korea certainly has the capability to construct such weapons, and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns” applies. Finally, unconventional delivery of WMD has the advantage over missile delivery for North Korea in that its origin is less traceable.

The United States came close to a preemptive strike against North Korean nuclear capabilities in the 1990s. While there are certainly risks of retaliation against regional US bases and allies, such a strike is still on the table as a policy option. It could have a salutary demonstration effect for other rogue states and proliferators, including Iran and Pakistan. The option of waiting, and continued technological development by a belligerant and immature North Korea, could make it impossible to take such actions in the future.

 

Public support for action against Syrian regime

On March 15, 2011, popular protests erupted in Syria as part of the Arab Spring. The Syrian regime brutally suppressed the protests, which grew into armed opposition and civil war. President Bashar Hafez al-Assad’s Ba’athist government fought against a splintered but militant opposition. The United Nations tracked atrocities committed on both sides, including more than 70,000 killed (CNN).

Assad obtains most of his political support from the authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, and Iran. The Arab League previously supported him, but as the atrocities mounted, now supports the opposition. There is substantial public support for action against the Syrian regime in the United States, France and Britain. The types of action palatable to the voting public in the United States and Britain, weary of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, do not include intervention. The public in newly-interventionist France does support deploying United Nations troops to Syria. All three countries support economic sanctions, and there is increasing support for supplying opposition groups with military materiel  (Council on Foreign Relations). Political leadership in the United States, France and Britain are responding with proxy war proposals consistent with this public opinion.

Expect limited military materiel support to Syrian rebels from the US, Britain and France in the near future. Due to insufficient public support, this will not include deployment of troops, and will only be sufficient to prolong — not win — the war. Over time, limited and therefore ineffectual military support may lead to increasing public support for deployment. If deployment occurs, expect a quick apparent win by the opposition, which turns into a long (5-15 years) and expensive period of nation-building and civil war as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Increased western military expenditures will improve yields in the defense sector, but increase government debt and taxes. Expect lower economic performance overall as defense expenditures aimed at Syria increase.

Opposition groups that will immediately benefit from western intervention in Syria will solicit such intervention in the short term. However, public opinion in Islamic countries find western intervention highly disagreeable, as do China, Russia and Iran. Expect increased global tensions and Islamic terrorism from western intervention in Syria. Expect Syrian opposition groups to quickly spurn their western benefactors as soon as military and other aid ends.

Watch for greater Bangladesh Army attempts to quash unrest, and a further turn towards terrorism by militant student groups

Unrest in Bangladesh has increased due to trials against Jamaat-e-Islami leaders stemming from war crimes in 1971 (Washington Post). Watch for greater army involvement in attempts to quash violent protesters. Such military action is likely to increase a turn towards terrorism by extremist youth groups. The most active of such groups will be Jamaat-e-Islami’s militant youth wing — the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS).

The ICS is strongest in universities and a member of some legitimate international Islamic organizations. However, they are intolerant Wahhabists, linked to Bangladesh domestic terrorism, and likely connected to international terrorist organizations (University of Maryland).