Category Archives: Debt

Stalemate in Egypt: Expect Years of Insurgency vs. Autocracy

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 1, No. 6, October 2013.

Map of Egypt. Source: University of Texas.

Map of Egypt. Source: University of Texas.

By Anders Corr, Ph.D.

Egypt is on the verge of being engulfed by a long-term insurgency. After a brief period of democratization following the Arab Spring, the world’s most populous Arab country has returned to a popular military dictatorship. General Sisi will likely lead the country, either as power behind the President, or as President himself. The primary difference between the Egypt of Sisi and the Egypt of the pre-Arab-Spring Mubarak will be a function of the overthrow of the democratic Islamism of President Morsi. A new outraged minority with pro-democracy and pro-Islamist beliefs fielded popular protests, and was repressed with lethal force. A significant minority of that minority will now divert their energy towards terrorism and organized insurgency. Continue reading →

Constitutional Change Needed to Avoid Future US Shutdowns

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 1, No. 6, October 2013

United States Capitol Building. Artwork by Damion Brandon.

United States Capitol Building. Artwork by Damian Brandon.

By Anders Corr, Ph.D.

The United States is, and continues to be, a politically stable country. Despite a shutdown of non-essential federal government services that started at midnight on October 1, uniformed military personnel and most federal services, including the postal service, federal courts, and federal prisons, will remain open and functional. The “shut-down” is more accurately described as a temporary defunding of non-essential federal services. A spending bill will pass within the next few weeks, and non-essential government services will return to normal. Nevertheless, the appearance of a shutdown of the United States Government has huge reputation costs both domestically and internationally. The United States needs legal change, including a Constitutional Amendment if necessary, that provides for automatic funding of government services in the event of a budgetary impasse between the President and Congress. Such automatic funding could take the form of budgetary continuing resolutions at prior levels, or given a threshold deficit level, budgets with non-partisan across-the-board cuts of 1-5%.  Continue reading →